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“An Analysis of Worldwide Space Launch Failures, 1980 – 2002” 
 
 
This paper presents an analysis of worldwide space launch failures over the period from 
1980 to early 2002.  A statistical summary of the data is provided, including comparisons 
of the different national failure rates.  Also covered are noteworthy observations on the 
nature of the failures and their impact.  A special analysis was performed on the first few 
launches of new and newly modified vehicles as well.  The paper concludes with 
recommendations for the launch industry relative to preventing launch failures. 
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An Analysis of Worldwide Space Launch Failures, 1980 – 2002 
 
 
  ACTA, Inc recently conducted a series of studies of space launch failures since 1980.  
ACTA is a national leader in risk analysis techniques, especially for space and missile launches, 
and the company required information on launch failures to support analyses and software 
development work for multiple customers.  We determined that data on launch failures was vital 
to the calculation of risk and the establishment of national launch safety standards, such as the 
work being accomplished by the Air Force and FAA’s Common Standards Working Group 
(CSWG).  In addition, information on launch failures also leads to a better understanding of the 
nature of the hazards involved and the probability of their occurrence.  The information revealed 
in these studies should be of interest to not only the safety community but to the entire launch 
industry. 
 
Background 
 
 1 January 1980 was chosen as the start date for data collection for a number of reasons.  
While launches and failures obviously occurred many years before 1980, most of the issues 
ACTA must deal with are not historical in nature, but are related to the risk associated with the 
launch of current and new vehicles.  It would have been possible, although challenging, to include 
failures from the beginnings of space launches, but the utility of doing so would have been 
doubtful at best.  It is our contention that the entire space launch industry is operating at a much 
different level of expertise than it was in the 1950’s and much of the 1960’s.  To include the 
failure history of early developmental efforts in estimating the reliability of even brand-new 
vehicles would be as inappropriate as would including the first airplane crash of 17 Dec 1903 in 
jet airliner reliability studies.   
 
 One of the early findings of interest is that there existed no adequate failure database.  
Numerous references were consulted, but none were found to be either complete or adequate.  As 
the new database was developed, it became obvious that data sources were numerous, diverse in 
nature, often inaccurate, and not widely available.  Some failures could not have been included 
without the personal knowledge of the researchers. 
 
 We soon determined that we had to rate all missions in the same manner, using the same 
success or failure criteria.  This approach was most significant in terms of classifying Space 
Shuttle missions.  While NASA might term a Shuttle mission as successful if the vehicle was 
placed into orbit and recovered successfully, we classified it in terms of the impact on the payload 
or mission, rather than simply a successful completion of the Shuttle flight. 
 
 We chose not to count payload failures that were not related to the ascent phase of the 
mission.  If a payload failed after achieving a good orbit and the failure was not clearly associated 
with a problem during the ascent phase, we did not consider it as a failure.  However, if the 
proper orbit was only achieved at the cost of an unusual expenditure of maneuvering propellant, 
we termed it as a failure.  While it is true that success or failure is often a matter of degree, it is 
very difficult, at best, to determine at what point a flawed mission should not be considered as a 
failure; further work may be required in this area. 
 
 Aside from collecting the data, we soon realized that we needed a categorization scheme.  
One of the first ways this requirement manifested itself was in categorizing what occurred during 
the flight.  Failure categories had been defined in a previous Air Force study, but in that effort had 
been focused on failures of interest to range safety.  Among its other deficiencies, we found that 
use of the existing categorization system would have resulted in at least half of all mission 
failures being rated the same as successful flights; this was unacceptable.  The failure 
categorization system that was developed incorporates not only the nature of events during the 
flight but also the cause.  The categorization system is shown in Table 1. 
 
 As the efforts of the CSWG continued, we also realized the need for an additional 
categorization system to reflect the development status of the launch vehicle (new or derived 
from existing vehicles) and the experience level of the manufacturer.  The CSWG studies also led 
to the need to develop a specialized database covering the first 10 flights of new or significantly 
modified launch vehicles.  The first 10-flight database essentially uses a subset of the failures 
database combined with information on the successful flights of new or modified vehicles.  
  
Top Level Results  
 
 Since 1 Jan 1980, there have been 151 space launch failures of all types, worldwide.  By 
“all type” of space launch failures, we mean those ranging from total destruction of the vehicle 
and payload to those in which there was merely some kind of negative impact on the payload’s 
mission.   
 
 Of the failures, there were 74 that resulted in no orbit of any kind being achieved, an 
indication of failures of special interest to the launch safety community.  Failure to achieve an 
orbit indicates that hardware came down in such a manner to create a potential hazard, whereas it 
is unlikely that hardware that achieved even an improper orbit created a hazard to people on the 
ground.  There was but one exception to this rule found, a Chinese Long March mission in which 
the payload fell off and impacted along the flight path while the vehicle upper stage achieved 
orbit.  The fact that very close to 50% of the failures were of the type that previously would have 
been rated as essentially a normal flight is indicative of one of the more serious shortcomings in 
the earlier failure categorization approach. 
 
 45  (29.8 %) of the failures were U.S. vehicles, 67 (44.37%) were 
Soviet/Russian/Ukrainian, 13 (8.61%) were Ariane (ESA/French), 9 (5.92%) were Chinese, 7 
(4.64%) were Japanese, and 5 (3.31%) were Indian.  The remainder were Israeli, Brazilian, and 
North Korean. 
 
Of the U.S. failures, 8 (17.78% of the U.S total) were launched by NASA, 15 (33.33% of 
the U.S failures) were U.S. Air Force or DoD mission failures, and 14 (31.11% of the U.S 
failures) mission failures were primarily commercial in nature.  4 (8.89% of the U.S failures) of 
the failures were combined USAF and NASA missions, and 3 (6.67% of the U.S failure) were 
combined NASA and commercial missions. 
 
In terms of percentages, the 151 failures were associated with 2349 missions, which 
equate to an overall worldwide-demonstrated probability of some kind of mission failure of 
6.43%.  If only total mission failures are considered, where no orbit of any kind was achieved (74 
failures), the demonstrated probability of failure is 3.15 %. 
 
The Soviet/Russian/Ukrainian failure rate is 4.36%.  The Ariane failure rate is 8.5% and 
the Chinese failure rate is 13.85%. 
 
The U.S. failure rate is 8.84%, and if only ELV missions are counted, the U.S. failure rate 
is 10.08%.  This represents a failure rate approximately140% to 150% of the worldwide average, 
a distressing bit of data, considering that the worldwide average includes relative newcomers to 
space launch such as India, Israel, Brazil, and North Korea. 
 
There are various reasons for the rela tively high U.S. failure rate.  Since 1980, the U.S. 
space launch industry has been characterized by the introduction of a number of new companies 
and the development of a number of new vehicles and new versions of older vehicles.  The 
national space launch policies in effect prior to 1984 resulted in a deterioration of the ELV 
industry due to the mandated reliance on the Space Shuttle, followed by a period of recovery and 
reactivation after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger. This turmoil was complicated by the 
changes and challenges associated with the introduction of new privately sponsored launches.  
These are mitigating circumstances but do not change the fact that U.S. launch vehicles have been 
significantly less reliable than the worldwide average in the period since 1980.    
 
In contrast to the U.S. experience, the Soviet Union had a very high launch rate during 
the early 1980’s, for example, 64 launches for the Soyuz/Molniya vehicle in the year 1980 alone.  
The Soviets and their follow-on launch companies launched three times as many vehicles as the 
U.S. did over the period 1980-2002.  This numerical advantage decreased the percentage impact 
of the associated failures, even though actually there were more Soviet/Russian/Ukrainian failures 
than U.S. failures over the period of interest.   Also, while the initial high Soviet launch rate 
launch rate decreased substantially over the following years, the Soviets and their descendant 
launch agencies introduced relatively few new vehicles over the period dating from 1980 as 
compared to the U.S.; they were for the most part operating proven vehicles rather than 
innovating to the degree done in the U.S. 
 
Solid Versus Liquid Vehicles 
 
 Solid fueled space launch vehicles account for only 20 of the 151 failures (13.25%) out of 
a total of 122 launches, for an overall failure rate of 16.39%. Of the solid vehicle failures, 2 
involved failures of liquid fueled upper stages.    
 
 8 of the solid vehicle failures were U.S. missions, out of a total of 66 U.S. solid vehicle 
launches, for a failure rate of 12.12%.  U.S. solid vehicles appear to be somewhat less reliable 
than do liquid fueled boosters, as do solid fueled vehicles in general.  This probably is due 
primarily to the fact that the majority of U.S. and international solid fueled boosters in use were 
developed since 1980, so the data contains an unusually high percentage of developmental 
failures.    
 
Patterns  
 
 In comparing worldwide launch rates to numbers of failures, we note no obvious 
correlation between the number of launches that occur in a given year (Chart 1).  The same is true 
of U.S. failures (Chart 2).  For the U.S. failures, there appears to be some small degree of 
correlation between decreased numbers of launches in the year following a high number of 
failures.  This is to be expected to some degree, since a failure usually means a delay in launches 
for the affected booster.   
 
However, examination of just the U.S. launch failure rate shows an interesting pattern.  
The failures appear to come in “waves”, with periods of lower failure rates following the peaks.  
The obvious reason for this is that following a failure, the industry becomes sensitized to the need 
to correct problems, but that following a period of successful launches, there is a decrease in 
vigilance, followed by more failures. 
 
Soviet/Russian/Ukrainian and Ariane launch failures also show a somewhat similar wave 
pattern, although the effect is less pronounced than the U.S. failures.  The Ariane failures are 
interesting in that the period between “waves” gets longer following the early development of the 
Ariane and then became closer together following the introduction of the Ariane 5. 
    
Impact of launch hazards  
 
 The data shows that 69 people have been killed by launch failures since 1980.   With the 
exception of the 7 crewmembers of the Space Shuttle Challenger, all of these fatalities occurred 
in either the Soviet Union/Russia/Kazakstan or in the People’s Republic of China.  The exact 
number of fatalities is rather uncertain, especially for those that occurred in China, where the 
actual numbers could be much higher, perhaps as much as several hundred killed. 
 
 In terms of property damage, the data available is all but nonexistent.  Even for U.S. 
launches, no property damage cost information is available readily.  This uncertainty is 
exacerbated by the fact that in some cases, such as the Delta II failure of Jan 97, some damaged 
facilities were abandoned or turned over to private companies for repair and maintenance. 
 
 One of the more interesting observations is that since 1980 there has not been one 
instance, worldwide, of a new launch vehicle built by an experienced company impacting on or 
near the launch pad on its first launch.  This is interesting, since such launches are usually 
regarded as higher in risk for the launch area.  Such impacts do occur for vehicles built by 
experienced companies, but not on the first flight.  
 
 In marked contrast to first flight vehicles made by experienced companies, new vehicles 
built by new companies frequently have impacted on or near the launch pad on first flights.  In 
terms of range safety precautions and launch base planning new companies and experienced ones 
present two radically different risks for new vehicles.  
 
Conclusions  
 
 A great deal of analysis can be performed on the data collected in the ACTA database 
and these efforts will continue as required.  At this stage, we can draw some conclusions and 
make some observations from both the data collected and the process required to collect it.    
 
 One obvious conclusion is simply is that launch failures continue to occur.   The 
launching of payloads into space remains an inherently hazardous business.  Launch failures 
occur much less often than in the early developmental days, but far more often than do 
comparable accidents in other modes of transportation.  There are those who argue that the 
maturity of the space launch industry argues for the relaxation of safety precautions, but the 
record of the last 22 years does not justify anything but a continuation of established procedures.  
In fact, thanks in large part to its well-proven safety standards, the U.S. has a superb record in 
protecting human life; other nations that use less stringent methods do not. 
 
Most importantly, it is clear that the United States is not making effective use of the hard 
won lessons of past failures.  This is reflected in the fact that the U.S. average failure rate for the 
last 22 years is around 50% greater than the world average.  The period of time since 1980 has 
been a turbulent one for the U.S. launch industry and many of the on-going trends do not favor 
retention of the country’s expensively acquired legacy of success.  In the past, restrictive 
regulations and compartmentalized attitudes prevented widespread dissemination of information 
on failures and their causes.  Today, government withdrawal from oversight responsibilities and 
the effects of commercial competition do not favor an effective lessons learned environment. 
 
The fact that U.S launch failures occur in fairly well defined waves that appear to 
represent the results of the industry re-learning past lessons learned is another indicator of the fact 
that the U.S. is not making effective use of its launch legacy.     
 
The United States should consider establishing a national launch failure database that 
would be open, accurate, and independently created.  Unlike past failure data and accompanying 
lessons learned, such a database should be both widely available and promoted.  The data ACTA 
has collected on launch failures would be an excellent starting point for such a database. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Launch Failure Categories 
 
Failure Results 
 
1. Impact on land soon after liftoff or no liftoff with destruction on pad 
2. Impact on course, further downrange than 1 above. 
3. Random azimuth/impact and/or destruct near IIP  
4. Random azimuth/impact and or destruct not near IIP  
5. Low altitude trajectory with destruct action 
6. Low/wrong and unusable orbit 
7. Low usable orbit 
8. S/C damaged/degraded/shortened life but in correct orbit and working or not working 
 
Failure Causes 
 
a. SRM explode/hot gas leak 
b. Liquid propellant system failure 
c. Low performance propulsion Stage 0/strap-on SRM 
d. Low performance propulsion Stage 1 
e. Low performance propulsion Stage 2 
f. Low performance propulsion Stage 3/AKM or S/C orbital insertion prop 
g. Stage or fairing or payload separation failure 
h. Fairing structural failure 
i. Guidance software failure 
j. Guidance hardware failure 
 
Failure Results and Failure Causes Use Protocol 
 
1. Partial failures are counted if they had an adverse mission impact 
2. Both Failure Results and Failures causes are lists, with multiple causes if required 
3. Examples: 
1-a 
6-f 
8-h 
6-d/I 
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